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The funds occupying of the large shareholder has been a common problem in 
China's capital market, which is also an important area of corporate governance. 
Sound internal governance and perfect external supervision market together constitute 
a healthy corporate governance environment. In the mature Western capital markets, 
high quality audit, as a part of an independent external oversight of the market , plays 
an important role in controlling agency conflict , so in our capital markets, can high 
quality audit also play an effective supervision role and thus control the large 
shareholder tunneling of the listed company? 
In this paper, 13,943 sample data for the China's non-financial sectors in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2012 is chosen to 
make an empirical study on the impact upon the relationship between the audit quality 
and the large shareholders tunneling. In this paper, a large-scale accounting firm is 
adopted as an alternative variable of high quality audit, in detail, whether the 
accounting firm is one of the domestic "Top Ten" accounting firms is selected to 
measure the scale of the accounting firm, which is also the innovation point of this 
paper compared with others which selected the international "Big Four" as an 
alternative variable of high quality audit. In addition, in the robustness test, we further 
alter the variable of funds occupation of the large shareholders and the high-quality 
audit, choosing an international "Big Four" as an alternative variable of the high 
quality audit to make sure that the conclusions of this paper are more robust.  
The results show that high quality audit and major shareholder tunneling was 
significantly negatively correlated, that is to say, if a listed company chooses the 
large-scaled accounting firms which represent the high quality audit in the annual 
audit, the degree of the funds occupation of the large shareholders will be lower . 
Through an in-depth study, in the state-controlled listed companies with more 
government intervention, compared with those non- state-controlled listed companies, 
the effect of the high-quality audit used for controlling the tunneling of the large 















controller will also significantly affect the deterrent effect of the audit quality upon 
the large shareholders. 
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股等方式实现对企业的最终控制（La Porta、Lopez-de-Silanes 和 Shleifer，1999①；












轻骑集团往来款项 28 亿多元全部计提了坏账准备，对其逾期对外担保近 6 亿多
元计入了或有损失，导致了当年巨亏 34 亿元，成为了沪深两市第一亏损上市公
司。截至 2004 年 12 月 31 日，三九医药（000999）的大股东三九集团及其附属
                                                        
① La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F and Shleifer A. Corporate Ownership Around the World[J]. Journal of Finance, 
1999, (54):471-518 
② Claessens S, Djankov S and Larry Lang. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian corporations[J]. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 2000,(58):81-112 




















亿元，在 2006 年末、2007 年末和 2008 年 1-2 月，分别违规占用资金 1.5 亿元、
1.7 亿元和 1.76 亿元。2007 年，九发股份（600180）亦用雷同的方式，通过其大
股东九发集团的其他关联企业将九发股份的资金转出，由九发集团无偿使用，涉
及金额超过 6 亿元。近年来，在上市公司募集的资金中就有近 10%被大股东占有，





















                                                        












































                                                        










































































































声誉的效应主要分为两个效应，“ 声誉的维持效应”( Reputation Maintenance 
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